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Exchange rates have been given increasing considera-
tion in the conduct ofmonetary policy. This article de-
velops a model ofthe determination ofthe exchange rate,
interest rate, price level, and level ofoutput to derive the
optimal response ofmonetary authorities to exchange rate
movements. The relative magnitudes and persistence of
disturbances, as well as the structure ofthe economy, are
shown toplay roles. Advocatesofusing monetarypolicy to
maintain greater fixity ofexchange rates view monetary
shocks as the predominant source ofdisturbances to the
economy.
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In recent years, a number of policy makers, academics,
and practitioners have suggested that the Federal Reserve
pay more attention to the dollar exchange rate in- its
formulation of monetary policy. These calls have ranged
from using monetary policy to maintain the value of the
dollar exchange rate at some benchmark or parity level, to
targeting the dollar within "zones," or simply using the
dollar as an important "signal," or indicator, for the
appropriate direction of monetary policy.
The Federal Reserve, in fact, has paid more attention to
the exchange rate in the formulation of policy during the
past three years. In testimony to Congress outlining mone-
tary policy objectives, Federal Reserve Chairman Green-
span has underscored the importance of the dollar as a
factor in monetary policy deliberations.' The growing
importance of the exchange rate in the implementation of
US. policy also is indicated in the monetary policy
directives of the Federal Open Market Committee.2
Moreover, since the Group of Five (US., Germany,
Japan, Britain, andFrance)Agreement inSeptember 1985,
the United States has expressed its willingness to cooper-
ate internationally with foreign central banks in using
exchange rates as an indicator of appropriate monetary
policy. On several occasions, policy makers have gone a
step further, suggesting that the exchange rate be used as
the primary "target" of policy rather than simply an
indicator. Forexample, the exchange rate dominated other
concerns when finance ministers and central bankers met
at the Louvre meeting of the G-7 (G-5 plus Canada and
Italy) in February 1987 and issued a communique calling
for greater policy coordination to stabilize the dollar.
Although policymakers recently havebeen more willing
to consider exchange rates in the formulation of monetary
policy, the advisability of doing so remains an unresolved
issue among economists. In a series of recent papers
supporting an increased focus on exchange rates, McKin-
non (1982, 1985) argues that the US., Japan, and Ger-
many should use purchasing power parity exchange rates
as the basis for a coordinated monetary policy.In McKin-
non's judgment, speculative capital flows arising from
shifts in international portfolio preferences are the domi-
nant factor affecting ex~rl:lnge rates. In such an environ-
ment, targeting the exchange rate would workto offsetthe
disturbances to financial markets.
17In contrast, other economists (for example, Obstfeld
[1985] and Willett [1985])have argued that this approach
to monetary policy is inappropriate. Willett argues that
". . . international considerations certainly should not be
ignored in monetary analysis, but exchange-rate targeting
offers neither a fail safeguide to monetary policy formula-
tion nor a painless wayto control inflation."? In Willett's
view, "real" factors, such as fiscal policy, productivity
shifts, and technological change, haveplayed a major role
in moving exchange rates in recent years.
In this debate, one ofthe most important theoretical and
empirical issues focuses on the distinction between the
"monetary" and "real" causes of exchange rate move-
ments. This formulation of the problem marks an impor-
tantdeparture from thetraditional monetarypolicy debate.
Traditionally, the policy debate has contrasted the desir-
ability of money aggregate targeting with interest rate
targeting (Poole, 1970). The new emphasis contrasts the
desirability of money aggregate targeting with exchange
rate targeting.
This article reviewsthe issues surrounding theappropri-
ate role ofexchange rates in theformulation and controlof
monetary policy in the United States. Our objectives are
two-fold. First, we attempt to clarify the meaning of an
exchange rate policy per se and how it relates to domestic
monetary policy. Second, in the context of the recent
debate and itsfocus on "monetary" versus "real" disturb-
ances to the economy, we illustrate some of the factors that
are important in determining an "optimal" exchange rate
policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
I, we discuss the instruments available to the central bank
in its attempt to implement an effective exchange rate
policy.Theimportantdistinction between"sterilized" and
"unsterilized" foreignexchange intervention is drawnand
itisargued that exchange rate policy is effective only if it
involves the latter. In Section II, we formulate an open
economy macroeconomic model of the determination of
the exchange rate, interest rate, price level, and level of
output. To focus clearly on the issues associated with the
present policy debate, the model is kept simple by allow-
ing only transitory money and real aggregate demand
shocks.
Wederive theoptimal response of the monetary authori-
ties to exchange rate changes in their attempts to minimize
output and price fluctuations intheeconomy. Weshowthat
the relative magnitudes of the disturbances facing the
economy, as well as the structure of the economy, play an
important role in determining the appropriate response of
the monetary authorities to exchange rate changes.
In Section III, wediscuss how the analysis is influenced
by other types of shocks to the economy and by the
introduction ofpermanent shocks. Specifically,weinvesti-
gate the role played by supply shocks (for example, oil
shocks, labor forceshocks, and productivity or technology
shocks) and by permanent disturbances to the exchange
rate and other variables affecting the economy's long-run
equilibrium. The value of an "exchange-rate focused"
monetary policy is evaluated under these circumstances,
and the contrast between interest-rate targeting and ex-
change-rate targeting is drawn. Section IV summarizes
and draws conclusions.
I. What is an Exchange Rate Policy?
An exchange rate policy implies a systematic effort on exchange rate, normally,the central bank must also change
the part ofthemonetary authorities to influencethe levelor some current market fundamentals to credibly implement
rate of change of the exchange rate. A variety of policy an exchange rate policy.
instruments are potentially available to influence the ex- In many respects, it is possible to accomplish the same
change rate, including foreign exchange market interven- objectives with either domestic monetary policy orforeign
tion, domestic monetary policy, various forms of controls exchange intervention policy. Domestic monetary policy
on international trade and capital flows, and official an- typically involvesa change in the domestic monetary base
nouncements of future policies. (that is, reserves held by the banking sector plus currency
Most attention has focused on either foreign exchange held by the public) brought about by the central bank
market intervention or domestic monetary policy as the through the open market puchase or sale of domestic
primary instruments available to the central bank in its government securities. Foreign exchange intervention in-
pursuit of a systematic exchange rate policy. Although volvestheexchangeofdomestic assets forforeignassetsby
there may be some potential value in "expectations" or the central bank. Foreign exchange market intervention
"announcement" effects associated with a central bank's activitymaytake twoforms: (1)"unsterilized," or "rnone-
announcement concerning the appropriate level for the tary," intervention operations-purchases or sales of the
18 Economic Review / Spring 1989foreign currency in the foreign exchange market that
have a direct effect on the domestic monetary base; and
(2) "sterilized," or "non-monetary," intervention-pur-
chases or sales of foreign currency in the foreignexchange
market that are simultaneously offset by domestic open
market operations.
In the case of unsterilized intervention, the central bank
changes its net foreign asset holdings through purchases
and sales of foreign exchange and allows a corresponding
change in its monetary liabilities, that is, the monetary
base. Forexample, the central bank maydecide topurchase
foreign currency from the private sector. To pay for its
purchase, the central bank credits banks' reserve accounts,
causing the domestic base to increase. The central bank
thenmaychoose to purchasea foreign government bond or
an interest-bearing foreign commercial bank account with
its foreign exchange receipts." However, whether the cen-
tral bankcontinuesto hold the foreign currency orinterest-
bearing foreign assets, the domestic monetary base has
increased in the same waythat it would with domesticopen
market operations.
Unsterilized intervention thus amounts to using the
foreign exchange market to conduct monetary policy in
lieu of the domestic financial market. In fact, in many
nations with relatively undeveloped domestic money mar-
kets, the foreign exchange market is the primary vehicle
through which the central bank adjusts commercial bank
reservesand the domestic money base.5
With sterilized intervention, in contrast, the central
bank offsets the change in its net foreign asset holdings
with a change in its net domestic assets. In the case of an
increase in its foreign asset holdings discussed above, the
central bank would sell a domestic bond in order to leave
domestic base money unchanged. The net effect is that the
central bank holds more foreign bonds and fewerdomestic
bonds, leaving base money unchanged. With the monetary
liabilities of the central bank unchanged in this case, the
effect of the foreign exchange market intervention opera-
tions on the monetary base is "sterilized."
Changes in the portfolio holdings of the private sector
mirror those of the central bank. In the examples above,
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
both sterilized and unsterilized intervention decrease the
foreign assets held by the public. Unsterilized intervention
increases the public's holdings of base money, and ster-
ilized intervention increases the public's holdings of do-
mestic bonds.
Fewdisagree that unsterilized intervention has a signifi-
cant influence on the market exchange rate. By changing
base money, monetary intervention influences the broader
monetary aggregates, prices, interest rates, exchange
rates, and usually real variables as well. Extensive empiri-
cal evidence suggests that monetary policy has a pervasive
influence over the nominal and real exchange rate in the
short-run, and is the primary determinant of the nominal
exchangerate in the longer run, as the nominal exchange
rate adjusts to reflect differences in trend inflation between
nations."
On the other hand, because it amounts to anexchange of
domestic bonds forforeign bonds held in private portfolios,
sterilized intervention will be effective only if investors
view the bonds as less-than-perfect substitutes (and the
investors are risk averse). In this instance, relative yields
and the exchange rate will adjust in response to the change
in the relative supplies of assets in portfolios.
However, most studies have failed to find systematic
effects on exchange rates arising from sterilized official
intervention operations over periods longer than a month.7
Moreover, attempts to find significantand systematic port-
folio ("risk premia") effects in the foreign exchange mar-
ket generally also havebeen unsuccessful. 8 In light of this
evidence, the Report of the Working Group on Exchange
Market Intervention (theJurgensenReport) commissioned
at the 1982 Versailles economic summit concluded that a
credibleexchange rate policy must be supported by funda-
mental policy shifts, particularly in monetary policy?
Thus in practice, as well as in theory, it is much more
effective for central banks to implement an exchange rate
policy by changingthe monetary base through unsterilized
intervention than through other potential instruments. We
will therefore concentrate on this aspect of exchange rate
policy in the analysis below.
19II. Analytics of Monetary Policyand Exchange Rate Determination
The Model
The model comprises fourequations: aggregate demand
and supply equations for the domestic good, an inter-
national interest rate relation linking domestic and foreign
interest rates, and an equation describing money market
equilibrium:
(5)
where the money supply is given by the sum of a constant
rate; and pidenotes the foreign price level. A rise in S
represents an increase in the amount of domestic currency
necessary to buy a unit of foreign currency and hence a
nominal depreciation in domestic currency value.
A rise in the real exchange rate St +pi- P» that is, a
realdepreciation of the domestic currency, induces greater
demand for domestic output while a higher real interest
rate induces lower current consumption (and investment)
andthereby reduces current demand. The demand disturb-
ance term may be interpreted as representing the effects of
transitory exogenous shifts in the demand for domestic
output arising, for example, from changes in autonomous
private and foreign (export) spending, or indomesticfiscal
expenditures. (Permanentshifts indemandare reflectedby
changes in the parameter ao.) Note that in the case of
perfect international substitution of goods, a1 becomes
infinite in size, and this aggregate demand equation re-
duces to the familiar purchasing power parity relationship.
Equation (3) represents the international interest rate
parity condition. Assuming risk neutrality on the part of
agents and perfect capital mobility, equilibrium in the
international bond market requires that thedomestic nomi-
nal interest rate, it, equal the foreign nominal interest rate,
it. plus theexpected depreciation of the domestic currency.
This condition implies that the return to holding domestic
and foreign assets is equal. An exogenous risk-premium
term could be introduced without affecting the analysis.
Finally,equation (4) represents the money market equi-
librium condition. This requires the domestic real money
supply to equal domestic real money demand, where the
latter depends positively on domestic output, and nega-
tively on the domestic nominal interest rate. In addition,
money demand is affected by a (white-noise) random
shock term, u'f, with mean zero and variance (J'm' The
shock term represents transitory shifts in the demand for
money. Forexample, a transitory shift by foreign residents
awayfrom foreign currency and toward domestic currency.
(currency substitution) or a transitory downward velocity
shift of domestic origin would be represented by positive
realizations of u'f.
Toallow thepossibility ofexchange market intervention
by monetary authorities, it is assumed that the nominal





We now formulate a rational expectations model of a
small open economy that illustrates the process by which
the equilibrium exchange rate is determined. Since our
focus is on the implications of short-term macroeconomic
disturbances, in this model we posit the existence of
transitory money and real demand shocks of domestic and
foreign origin. The implications of considering aggregate
real supply shocks andpermanent shocks within the model
are discussed in Section III.
where all variables (except interest rates) are expressed in
logarithms, foreign variables are denoted by an asterisk
(*), andE,represents theexpectations operator conditional
on information available at time t.
Equation (1)describes domestic output supply behavior,
with output Yt depending on unanticipated changes in the
domestic price level, P, - Et-1Pt' This specification
implicitly presumes that the wages at which workers sup-
ply their labor to firms are based on price expectations
formed from information available in the previous period.
Because of this one period "contract lag," firms expand
outputwhen current prices rise above theprice expected by
workers. In the absence of unanticipated price changes,
output equals its "natural" level, co' 10
Equation (2) describes domestic aggregate output de-
mand behavior. Aggregate real demand for the domestic
good depends on a constant term ao;positively on the real
exchange rate, St + pi- p.: negatively on the domestic
real interest rate, it - (E, Pt+l - p}; and on a (white-
noise) random demand disturbance term u1. with mean
zero and variance (J'd. ll Here St denotes the nominal
exchange rate defined as the domestic currency price of
foreign currency; itdenotes the domestic nominal interest
20 Economic Review / Spring 1989trend component mand a component that varies in re-
sponse to deviations in the current level of the nominal
exchange rate from its long-run equilibrium levels.
A zero value of k corresponds to a policy that targets
money supply growth. A non-zero value of k corresponds
to a monetary policy that responds to the current level of
the exchange rate as a signal of economic conditions.P
'.The ~olar cases of fixed and flexible rates correspond to
infinite and zero values, respectively, of the intervention
parameter, k. Intermediate values of k correspond to man-
aged floating. With more general specifications of the
interve~tion rule, monetary authorities might respond to
other signals as well, such as the domestic interest rate or
price level. (See Tumovsky [1981].)13
Appsitive value of k implies that policy is directed at
"leaning against the wind," that is, a depreciation in
domestic currency value(rise in s) induces a contractionof
the money supply. This is a widely employed policy for
moderating exchange rate movements. A negative valueof
k implies the opposite policy of "leaning with the wind."
For simplicity, the analysis retains the small-country
assumption, and treats the foreign country variablesp*and
~ t
It as exogenous, constant, and for convenience, equal to
zero.
Equilibrium Adjustment
The set of equations (1)-(5)can be solved forthecurrent
valuesofYt, P» s; and itasfunctions of moneyanddemand
disturbances: 14
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and y, p, S, and i are the long-run equilibrium levelsof the
system, which may be shown to equal:
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y = Co
p = m+ + bi* - b2cO




Observe that the long-run nominal exchange sdepends
~n long-run real and nominal factors. The long-run equi-
hbfiumvalueof thedomesticcurrencydepreciates(&rises)
as the long-run domestic price level (p)rises, asthelong-
runoutput level (co) rises, and as aggregate demand (ao)
shiftspermanently downward.
Output, the domestic price level, the exchange rate, and
the domestic interest rate may diverge from their long-run
equilibrium values because of transitory disturbances. We
now discuss the effects of transitory increases in nominal
money demand and in real aggregate demand on the
equilibrium for the economy.
A transitory rise in money demand (u'!') induces a
nominal appreciationofthe domestic currency,arise inthe
domestic interest rate, and a decline in the domestic price
level. In addition, because the nominal currency apprecia-
tion is larger than the fall in domestic prices, the rise in
money demand causes a decline in St - Pt> that is, a real
appreciation as well. IS Consequently, the demand for the
domestic good decreases. With wages fixed during the
contract period, the fall in the domestic price level raises
the producer's real wage, implying a fall in aggregate
supply and output. Thus during the contract period, the
upward shift in money demand has a contractionaryeffect
on the economy.
On the other hand, a transitory positive real demand
shock (utf )induces a nominal appreciation ofthe domestic
currency and a rise in the domestic price level, as well as a
real appreciation, that is, a fall in St - Pr Intuitively, the
demand shock creates an excess demand for domestic
output. Excess demand then induces an increase in thereal
value of the domestic currency to shift demand awayfrom
the domestic market.
The sign and magnitude of the intervention parameter k
plays an important role in the equilibrium adjustment of
the economy. 16 Observe that if k is positive, the larger is k,
the .. l~rger is the denominator Ao. Consequently, from
expressions (6)-(9), the responses of output, the price
level, the exchange rate, and the interest rate to monetary
shocks are less (in absolute value) than in the absence of
any.intervention. Intuitively, the more policymakers lean
against the wind (k > 0), the more theeffects ofany money
demand shocks are dampened by offsetting changes in the
21money supply in response to changes in the exchange rate.
Analogously,if the authorities lean with the wind (k < 0),
then exchange rate movements exaggerate equilibrium
responses to money shocks.
In contrast, it can be shown that the price and output
responses toaggregatedemand disturbances aremagnified
in thecase ofleaningagainst thewind andare dampened in
the case of leaning with the wind. Forexample, a positive
demand disturbance directly creates higher output and
prices, but because the monetary authority responds to the
associated appreciation in the domestic currency by in-
creasing (decreasing) the money supply, the monetary
authority induces a stronger (weaker) output response
when a strategy of leaning against (with) the wind is
pursued.
OptimalIntervention
The optimal degree of intervention can be determined
by findingthat valueofkthatminimizes theexpected value
ofa particular policy loss function (L). For simplicity, we
assume that policymakers are concerned with minimizing
a weighted average of squared deviations of domestic
output and the price level from their equilibrium levels:
L = wlY - yp + wip - i5P
o S wj S 1, 0 S w2 S 1, wj + w2 = 1
It is assumed that indetermining theoptimal exchange rate
response function, policy makers know the structural
parameters of the economy; the only source of uncertainty
concerns the relative magnitudes of the stochastic disturb-
ances.
It can then be shown that the formula for the optimal
intervention strategy (k) has the following form:
where (Jm and (Jd signify the variances of the transitory
money and aggregate demand shocks, respectively.
According to equation (10), the optimal intervention
strategy depends on the relative variances of money and
aggregate demand shocks, as well as on the structural
parameters ofthe economy. In the presence of both domes-
tic monetary and aggregate demand disturbances, a lim-
ited form of foreign exchange intervention is called for,
with the degree of intervention determined by the relative
importance of the two disturbances.17
Equation (10) implies that the greater is the relative
magnitude of money shocks, the more the authorities
22
should lean against the wind and intervene to resist ex-
change rate movements (that is, the higher should be the
value ofk) since this policy stance will lead to smaller
output effects arising from the initial money shocks. Quite
simply, a positive money demand shift tends to appreciate
the exchange rate. If the central bank increases the money
supply in response, money market equilibrium may be
restored with little or no effects on real output." Con-
versely,the greater is the relative magnitude of aggregate
demand shocks, the lower should be the value of k, and the
less should the authorities lean against the wind. Ifthe var-
iance of aggregate demand disturbances is large enough,
infact, leaning with thewind (that is, k< 0) isdesirable. In
this instance, the authorities will again intervene, but in a
manner that leads toa decrease in the money supply in
response to the exchange rate appreciation so as to lessen
the stimulatory effect on output.
In the extreme case that money disturbances aloneaffect
the economy (Jd = 0), (10) implies that ktakes on an
infinite positive value, and perfectly fixed exchange rates
are desirable. This corresponds with the rule proposed by
McKinnon (1982, 1985). One interpretation of McKin-
non's views is that the preferences of international inves-
tors between foreign and domestic currency are unstable
(so-called "speculative" capital flows), and in tum lead to
a predominance of money demand shocks in the U.S.
economy. Ample evidence of U.S. money demand shocks
exists, and some research indicates foreign sources of
shocks, as well. The main rationale for McKinnon's policy
recommendation of greater fixity in exchange rates (larger
k) is based on his perception of the greater relative impor-
tance of money shocks facing the economy. 19
Perfectly flexiblerates, in contrast, are desirable only in
the special case that aggregate demand disturbances alone
affect the economy(Jm = 0) and the interest sensitivity of
money demand is zero (bj = 0). A major economic
rationale for Willett's (1985) policy recommendation of
greater exchange rate flexibility (lowkvalue)ishis percep-.
tion that real disturbances have been a relatively large
source of uncertainty in the economy over the past decade.
Optimal exchange rate policy depends on the structural
parameters of the economy in addition to the relative
magnitudes of disturbances.20 Forexample, in this frame-
work the authorities should lean harder against the wind,
the greaterare the sensitivities of aggregate demand to the
real exchange rate (aj ) and of aggregate supply to price
surprises (c.).
Note that the relative preferences of policymakers for
output or inflation (wi> w2) do not appear in expression
(10). The reason is that in this simple model, the economy
is affected only by aggregate money and real demand
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disturbances. Policies that minimize output fluctuations
also minimize variations in inflation. Hence, the output-
inflation tradeoff reflected in the weights wj and w2
assigned by policymakers in their loss function drops out
ofthe optimal intervention function.
This can be illustratedwith Chart1.Thechart showsthe
effects on the economy of a monetary shock (downward
shift in money demand) or goods market shock (rise in the
demand for domestic output). Both shift the aggregate
demand CUrve upward from Do to Dj' and put temporary
upwardpressureonprices and output. Thesupplyschedule
is unaffected. To offset the positive shock to aggregate
demand, the central bank contracts money and shifts
aggregate demand back to Do. Since the contraction of
aggregate demand stabilizes both output andtheprice level
around the equilibrium values yand ft, there is no policy
conflict in this case between the output andpriceobjectives
of the central bank." In Section III we discuss how this
result is affected by the introduction of real supply shocks.
III. Qualifications andExtensions
The simple analytical model described above demon-
strates some of the complexities involved in attempting to
formulate the appropriate role of exchange rates as an
indicator or signal in the conduct of monetary policy. We
have focused on two important types of shocks-money
disturbances andreal-aggregate demand disturbances-to
help us distinguish between the most divergent points of
view.among.economists concerning theappropriate role of
exchange rates in monetary policy decisions. The real
world is more complicated than any simple model-can
hope to depict, however, and to some extent, the gains in
clarity associatedwith our model partly havebeen madeby
abstracting from several other important policy issues. In
this section weextend theanalysis toaddress someofthese
complications. Specifically, we investigate the complica-
tions arising when the economy faces shocks to aggregate
supply, and when the shocks..are permanent rather. than
transitory. We also consider the relative merits of an
exchange rate rule as opposedto an interest raterule in the
conduct ofmonetary policy under these circumstances.
Supply Shocks
The introduction of a stochastic term in the real supply
equation(l) captures the effects oftransitory supply shifts
arising from changes in technology and productivity,labor
force growth, or natural resource availability in theecon-
omy. The oil shocks of the early and late 1970s, for
Federal Reserve Bank ofSanFrancisco
example,are typically viewed as having significant unan-
ticipatedeffects on theoutput supply function. Introducing
supply shocks complicates the analysis in two important
ways.
First, the optimal degree of monetary response k be-
comes a function of the variance of supply disturbances as
well as of money demand and real aggregate demand.
However,the appropriate response to exchange rate move-
ments generated by supply disturbances no longer is clear-
cut because the effect of a supply shock on the exchange
rate is ambiguous. If goodsdemand is highly responsive to
the real exchange rate (that is, foreign and domestic goods
are close substitutes) and to real interest rates (OJ and 02
are large), then the domestic currency will appreciate in
response to a positive supply disturbance. If demand is not
responsive (OJ and 02 are small), however, the currency
wili.depreciate in order to induce the purchase of the
additiona! domestic output associated with the positive
supply shock. 22 Thus, assuming policymakers are able to
distinguish between supply and demand shocks, they still
must know not only the signs of the relevant structural
Parameters (OJ and 02)' but also their magnitudes to
developthe optimal response ofmonetary policy to move-
ments in exchange rates.
A secondcomplication associated with the introduction
ofsupply shocks inthe model concerns theoutput-inflation
tradeoff. With supply shocks, output and the price level




weights policymakers place on inflation and output sta-
bility in their loss function (wj ' w2) become important for
the optimal monetary response to exchange rates.
Chart 2illustrates the basic conflict forthecase ofan ad-
verse (negative) supply shock that shiftsthe aggregate sup-
ply schedule from 50to 5j • Downward pressure is placed
on output (toyj) and upward pressure is placed on theprice
level (to Pj)' With only one instrument (money), policy-
makers mustchoose which target, orlinear combination of
the twotargets, they wish to stabilize. Forexample, ifpoli-
cymakers areconcerned solely with output stability (wj =
1, w2 = 0 in the loss function), the central bank should
expand aggregate demand to D'; This would stabilize
output at its long-run equilibrium, but would exaggerate
the pricerise toP2'Theappropriate exchange rate policy in
this case is to lean with (against) the wind if the supply
shock induces a currency depreciation (appreciation).
At the other extreme, if policymakers are solely con-
cerned with price stability (w j = 0, w2 = 1), then the
appropriate response would be to follow a contractionary
monetary policy and reduce aggregate demand fromDoto
D2 . This would keep prices around the longer-term equi-
librium (P), but also would exaggerate the contractionary
effect on output and move y to Yl. In this case, the
policymaker should lean against (with) the wind if the
supply shock induces a currency depreciation (apprecia-
tion).
Thus, in general, when the economy is facing a supply
shock, greater output stability is gained at the expense of
larger fluctuations in price and vice versa. Hence, policy-
makers' views of the relative costs involved in the output-
24
inflation tradeoff become an important element in the
determination of the optimal exchange rate policy.23
Permanent Disturbances
The focus of our analysis thus farhas been on short-term
stabilization policy.Our analytical framework for the opti-
mal monetary response to exchange rate changes was
therefore couched in terms of transitory disturbances to
various markets.
In reality, of course, the economy faces not only tem-
porary shocks but also permanent shocks. Moreover,
temporary shocks may persist for more than one period.
Forexample, the rise of the dollar during the early to mid-
1980s was associated first with a significant monetary
contraction and then with a large fiscal expansion. These
were not simple one-period transitory disturbances, but
lasted over a period of several years.
The effects of these policy shifts on the exchange rate
and the price levelhavebeen the subject of a large body of
research. Unquestionably, thelong-term equilibrium value
of the exchange rateswasaffected by these developments.
The bulk of the empirical research supports our model's
prediction that a permanent monetary contraction (decline
inIii) or fiscalexpansion (risein ao)works to appreciate the
long-term equilibrium value of the dollar exchange rate.
This is seen by inspection of the expression forsgiven in
Section II.
Our central bank loss function assumes that policy-
makers attempt to stabilize output and prices around their
long-run equilibrium values. It is implicitly assumed that
there is no attempt to offset longer-term movements in
these values, and as such no reaction by thecentral bank to
changes in s. The justification for this approach is that
monetary policy has no effects on the long-term (equi-
librium) value of output, regardless of the form of the
policy rule and response to exchange rate movements.
This formulation of the problem is appropriate for a
short run focus over the course of the business cycle, but.
raises an important question: what if the central bank
cannot distinguish transitory (s - s) movements from
long-term equilibrium movements (s) in the exchange
rale?·We have assumed that the central bank knows the
equilibriumvaluesof all variables, includingthe exchange
rate, and therefore can distinguish transitory movements,
as distinct from movements in the long-run values. How-
ever,if there is a confusion between transitory and perma-
nentmovements; in addition to uncertainty concerning the
nature of the underlying disturbances (real or monetary
shocks), the noise in the information provided by the
exchange rate is increased.
Economic Review / Spring1989In practice, of course, policy makers do havedifficulty
distinguishing between permanent and transitory disturb-
ances. Ifthe Federal Reserve had attempted to offset the
appreciating dollar associated with the persistent fiscal
stimulus between 1982 and 1984, for example, monetary
policy would have been significantly more expansionary
than it was. The monetary stimulus to aggregate demand
would have pushed nominal output growth and inflation
significantly higher, making U.S.-produced goods more
expensive even with an unchanged dollar exchange rate.
Theequilibriumreal value of the dollar (s + p* p) still
would have appreciated. Hence, it is apparent in this
example that an attempt by the Fed to offset the sustained
pressures on the dollar would have primarily shifted the
effects away from the nominal exchange rate towards the
domestic price level. Thus, to the extent that permanent or
very persistent shocks are important, monetary policy
needs toallow the exchange rate to adjust to the new long-
run equilibrium level.
Exchange-Rate versus Interest-Rate Thrgets
Exchange rates and interest rates are both asset prices
which, if allowed to adjust freely to market conditions,
might serve as indicators of the direction of monetary
policy. This raises an interesting question: in what ways
does an exchange-rate target differ from an interest-rate
target?
In ourmodel, as long as the economyonly faces shocks
to real goods demand and/or money demand, there is no
substantive difference between an exchange-rate policy
target and an interest-rate policy target. This is seen in the
reduced-form equations (8) and (9)forsandi, respectively.
The exchange rate and interest rate response to money
demand .andreal demand shocks are equal in magnitude
and oppositein sign.
Thus, for.example, a transitory increase in U.S. money
demand would raise interest rates and cause the dollar to
appre<::iate. Similarly, a transitory increase in the demand
forUS. goodsalso wouldraise interest rates and cause the
dollar to. appreciate. In both cases, exchange rates and
ill.t~re~tratesgivethe same signal and do not help to
distinguish betw~e.nthe two types of shocks. The Federal
R.es~rvetherefore gains no additional information by look-
ing at interest rates (exchange rates) when following an
ex.<::h.ange-rate(interest-rate)rule inits attemptsto stabilize
OUtput and prices.
Wh.ensupply shocks are present, however, this is not
necessarily. the case since the interest rate may reveal
information about economic conditionsthat is notreflected
inexchange rates alone. Forexample, under circumstances
discussed above (low aggregatedemand responsiveness to
changes in exchange rates and interest rates), a positive
supply shock, such as a transitory fall in oil prices, will
cause the domestic currency to depreciate and raise inter-
est rates. In this case, looking at both exchange rates and
interestrates wouldenable policymakers todistinguish the
supply disturbances from other shocks that woulddepreci-
ate the dollar and lower interest rates, such as a fall in
money demand or in goodsdemand. Thus, under the more
general circumstances where supply shocks are taken into
account, an optimal monetary policy rule would incorpo-
rate both exchange rates and interest rates. 24
VI. Conclusions
This paper has investigated the issues surrounding a
central bank policy of targeting exchange rate levels. We
first distinguish between the various policy instruments
that are potentially available to the central bank in its
attempts to "manage" exchange rates. We argue that a
credible exchange rate policy must be supported by mone-
tary policy in order to be effective. However, we also
demonstrate that a monetary policy designed to minimize
exchangerate fluctuations will not generally bean optimal
policy. In particular, the appropriate monetary response to
an exchange rate movement should be dictated by the
extent to which the exchange rate provides a reliable
"signal" to future changes in variables of ultimate policy
interest, that is, output and/or prices.
To analyze these issues, we present an open economy
macroeconomic model that explicitly allows for different
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
degrees of monetary response to exchange rate changes.
The model takes into account short-term (transitory) dis-
turbances to the goods market and money market. In this
stochastic setting, we show that the optimal monetary
response to exchange rate changes depends on the nature
of the shocks the economy faces.
In the introduction we pointed out that two polar views
on the appropriate use of exchange rates have dominated
the policy debate; one view argues for strong monetary
responses to incipient exchange rate movements (fixed
exchange rates) and the other view argues for relatively
little monetary response (floating exchange rates).
Our analysis suggests that there are reasonable argu-
ments supporting both points of view, depending on how
one reads the historical record on the types of disturbances
that have predominated. Namely, the main conclusion
25arising from our theoretical analysis is that an economy
facing primarily money market disturbances will benefit
from a strong monetary response to exchange rate fluctua-
tions. An active exchange rate policy in this sense will
reduce domestic outputfluctuations. However, if goods
market disturbances.are the.primary source of economic
fluctuations, thenless active exchange rate management
would be appropriate.
Those who argue for an "activist" monetary response
andrelative fixityin exchangeratesllsuallyviewmonetary
shocks-.eitherofdomestic 'or foreign origin-as having
been the predominant source ofshocks to the US.econ-
omy over the past decade.Moreover, the presumption is
that the relative frequency and magnitude·ofthemonetary
shocks will continue to predominate in the nearfuture. In
contrast,those who argue·for a limited monetary response
usually viewreal demand disturbances-eitherof domes-
tic or foreign origin--as thepredominantsource ofshocks
to the U.S. economy. These different readings of the
historical record lead observers to different views on
optimal exchange rate-policy
There is ample evidence of numerous real and monetary
shocks influencing the U.S. economyover the past decade.
Examples of recent real aggregate demand shocks are the
large shifts in government spending and taxpolicies under
26
the Reagan Administration, the introduction of new com-
petitors from East Asia in world trade, and the boom in
business investmentspending in the early 1980s. Exam-
ples of recent monetary shocks are the shift in foreign
investment preferences toward U.S. assets in the early
1980s, •financial innovation •in the .U.S. economy and
related velocity shifts, and Federal Reserve monetary
control regime shifts.
Which type.ofshocks has been more important, how
persistellthave theybeen,andwhichwill likelypredomi-
nateinthe future? Therelativeimportanceofshocks in the
historical record is an empirical issue that remains to be
resolved, despite voluminous researchin this area. In the
face of.this uncertainty, to.say nothing of the problems
introduced by such supply shocks asthe movements in the
price ofoil over the last 15years, it would appear that some
pra~matismin policymaking would be appropriate. One
can interpret U.S. policy actions in this light. The Fed's
recent move to a greater focus on the exchange rate is
largely a pragmatic response to recent events and the
concern that at times the degree of exchange rate volatility
has been excessive. A gradual move away from perfectly
flexible exchange rates and toward greater exchange rate
fixity supported by monetary policy has been the result.
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1. SeeGreenspan (1988).
2. Furlong (1989) uses the order in which-various eco-
nomicfactors werementioned intheFOMCmonetarypol-
icydirectivesfrom1985 throughAugust1988 toevaluate
the importance of each factor in policy decisions. This
ranking criterionshows thatincreasingattention hasbeen
paid to exchangerates.
3. Willett (1985), p. 212.
4. T~e c~ntrat ba~kneednotconvertitsforeign exchange
recelptsmto foreign currencysecurities, but in practice,
central banks rarely hold the moniesofothercountries.
5. Switzerland is an exampleof an industrial nation that
undertakes allof its open marketoperations through the
foreign exchangemarket.
6. Empirical evidence showing a strong link between
changes in the money aggregates and exchange rates
has been found by Frankel (1979) and Mussa (1979),
among others.
7. SeeObstfeld (1982), Hutchison (1984), andLoopesko
(1984).
8. SeeFrankel (1982).
9. Thesaleof government bonds to financegovernment
budget deficits generallyplays a larger role indetermin-
ing the bond mix in privateportfolios than doesinterven-
tion. This poses another difficulty for central banks in
using sterilized intervention as a tool for exchange rate
management.
10. Inanopen economy, aggregate supply maydepend
also on anticipated changes in the price of domestic
goods relative to changes inthe generalprice level, and
hence on changes in the expected real exchange rate.
However, we implicitly assume that the ex ante labor
supply function is inelasticwith respectto the real wage
priorto signing laborcontracts.Once laborcontracts are
signed, the (ex post) amountof labor supplied is deter-
. minedbythedemandforlaborwhichdependsonlyonthe
price of domestic goods. This implies that aggregate
supply would be independentof the real exchange rate.
Equation (1) could bemodifiedtoincorporatewage index-
~tion. With full waqeindexation, anunanticipated change
!n the general price level can lead to proportional ad-
justrnent of the domestic price. Inthis case, unless there
were aggregate supply shocks, output wouldalways be
constant. For a concise discussion of these issues, see
Marston (1985).
11. Forsimplicity, thereal domesticinterest rate isdefined
intermsofp, thepriceofthedomesticgood alone, rather
~han the general price level, which includesthe price of
Imported goods. An analogous assumption is employed
below when the nominal moneysupply is deflated by p.
The general results are unaffected by this simplification.
12. Thedifferencebetween usingtheexchange rateasa
:'sig~al," or "indic~t~r," asopposedtoa"target,"ofpolicy
IS fairly subtle. This IS because any systematic monetary
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response to exchange ratemovements will, inturn, influ-
encethevalueoftheexchangerate. Inthecasewherethe
signalisanexogenousvariable to.thesystem (anobserv-
able signal that reflects, for example, a composite of
undertyingexogenous disturbances), this complication
d.oes n~t arise. It is noteworthythat amonetary policythat
simplyfixesthE; valueoftheexchange ratedissipatesthe
"signalling" valueoftheexchange rateunless equivalent
infprrnati()n concerningthe changes in internationalrEl-
servesassociatedwith.government intervention activities
is revealed to agents. See Bhandari (1982), Kimbrough
(1983, 1984), Flood and Hedrick (1985), and Glick and
Wihlborg (1986).
13.ltshou~d be notedthat!n the model as specified,
I~gged .variables would be Irrelevant to policyrnakers,
since disturbances are not serially correlated and the
currentperiod's equilibrium is always independentof the
previous period's equilibrium.
14. Fordetails,seeGlickand Hutchison (1989). Itshould
be noted that the particular assumptions of one-period
cont.ract lags,transitory disturbances,andnoinventory or




valueof a variableisthe long-runstationary valueof that
variable.
15. Thismaybe seenby subtractingthe coefficientfor a
mon~y. de~and shock in (7) from the corresponding
coefficient In (8). Recall that the foreign price level is
assumed constant, implyingp* = O.
~6. Notethatinthismodel,foreignexchangeintervention
IS based on the authorities' knowledge of the current
exchange rate, while agents base wageson information
~vailabl~ in pe~iod t - 1. It is this asymmetry that allows
Intervention to Influence output. Thisasymmetry may be
justified by relatively greater costs associated with re-
~egotiating nominal wagescompared withadopting pol-
ICy responses. SeeHenderson (1984).
17. The role of the relative variances of disturbances in
determining exchange rate policy previously has been
noted by Boyer (1978), Frankel and Aizenman (1982),
Henderson (1984), and Devereux (1988). Theresults are
an~loQous to those of Poole (1970) for optimal monetary
policyInaclosedeconomy. Morecomplexpoliciesinvolv-
ing two policy instruments are necessary if agents have
morethanoneobjectiveor ifthe coefficients ofthemodel
are not known withcertainty.
18. It should be pointed out that Frenkel and Aizenman
(1982) draw the opposite conclusion and conclude that
greater exchange rate flexibility should be permitted if
moneyshocksdominate. Thereason isthattheyemploya
model that assumes purchasing power parity and no
wagecontractlagssothatincomeandtheexchangerate
essentially are determined by money market conditions.
27In the presence of money shocks, their model implies that
it is better to restore money market equilibrium by allowing
price changes to occur through exchange rate changes
thanthrough output changes.
19. This rationale for monetary policy in the form of un-
sterilized intervention presumes that the predominant dis-
turbances to.the economy are portfolio shifts between
domestic and foreign monies. It, however, the predomi-
nant disturbances are shifts between domestic and for-
eign-currency denominated securities and ifthese assets
are imperfect substitutes, the appropriate monetary pol-
icy would be sterilized interv(jntion.lnthis case, the
central bank will offsetthe shift in asset demand without
affecting the money supply.
20. It shouldb.e emphasized that the Lucas critique
(1972) implies that the behavioral parameters ofthemodel
28
depend on agents' expectations concerning future gov-
ernment policies. Therefore, changes in government pol-
icies may affect the structure of the economy and the
ettectiveness of the policies themselves,
21. An alternative way to draw this conclusion is to note
fromthe reduced-form equilibrium expressions (6)and (7)
that output and price fluctuations are multiplicatively re-
lated by the parameter C1'
22. The relevant condition for an appreciation in re-
sponseto a positive supplydisturbanceis(a, + a2)b2> 1.
SeeGlick and Hutchison (1989).
23. The introduction ofwage indexation generallyre-
ducesthe impactofsupplyshocks. See Devereux (1988).
24. Imperfect substitutability between domestic and for-
eignassets also would affect the relative information
content of the exchange rate and interest rate.
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